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REPLY BR1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bezzant fails to acknowledge that this case is not about political speech or a public 
issin II is iilniiil Ddentiint Ibiic//aiilMI IIKIIU iously and unnecessarily attacking 
Plaintiff, William T. Jacob ("Jacob"), a private citizen. Jacob nv\w w nK i piiiiblii iv.m . 
Bezzant did not demonstrate that the district court's dismissal of Jacob's claims 
ect, particularly when accepting Jacob's allegations as 
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his fa\ ai ! \v IIM , iinttH dov1. "V - K! In e 
was published in the process of government. Moreover, even if Bezzant could make such 
nig, he has conceded that Jacob's claims were not wholly without merit. Thus 
sanctions were not justi.fi.ed cvn 1 »i I:u \ "I» >. 
Bezzant has also failed to show, when accepting all of Jacob's factual allegations 
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, that Jacob's §1983 claims were 
insufficiently pled such that sanctions were justified. Further, Bezzant has failed to rebut 
Jacob's as-applied challenge under the Open Courts provision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BEZZANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL 
UNDER THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT IS CORRECT WHEN VIEWING ALL FACTS 
AND INFERENCES IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO JACOB 
The district court dismissed Jacob's claims under the anti-SLAPP Act (the "Act") 
on the ground that Bezzant's Notice was "protected political speech." Rl 825:12-14. The 
district court's decision to award Bezzant attorneys' fees was based upon this finding. Id; 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt."), Addendum C. 
As the proponent of the motion for judgment on the pleadings/motion for 
summary judgment ("Motion"), Bezzant must show the district court's ruling was correct 
when accepting Jacob's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences 
in Jacob's favor. In re. Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997).1 Bezzant was 
This Court recently articulated a departure from this heightened standard of review when 
considering whether a statement is susceptible to a defamatory meaning. O 'Connor v. 
Burningham, 2007 UT 58,1fi[26-7, 165 P.3d 1214. Therefore, the analysis in this section 
does not apply to that portion of the court's ruling. However, under the analysis in 
O'Connor the district court in this case should have found the statements did convey a 
defamatory meaning. The publication context was an environment of fear, retaliation and 
abuse by public officials against private citizens, and a deliberately malicious "Urgent 
Election Notice," "Apology," and "Correction," initially drafted and approved by public 
official and candidate Tom Hunter and published by Bezzant to preserve his friendship 
and business relationship with Hunter and to avoid being sued. Thus the context was an 
effort to please AFC public officials by holding Jacob out as an object of public 
contempt, hatred and ridicule. This issue will be addressed in greater depth below. 
2 
also required below to present clear and convincing evidence Jacob filed his claims to 
interfere with or chill Bezzant's participation in the process of government. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-58-104(l)(b). Bezzant has failed to meet or to acknowledge these burdens. 
Jacob, a private citizen and business owner whose reputation for integrity, 
honestly, and sound judgment is essential to the success of his business, established a 
long-standing confidential relationship with Defendants in 1993 whereby Jacob 
periodically provided Defendants with information about current events in exchange for 
Defendants protecting Jacob's anonymity. R280:5, 11; R1528. It can reasonably be 
inferred from these facts that Defendants knew Jacob highly valued his anonymity. Thus, 
it is also reasonable to infer that when Defendants publicly disclosed Jacob's name in the 
Urgent Election Notice ("Notice"), they did so with malice and a with purpose to hold 
Jacob out as an object of public ridicule, contempt, and hatred. That Bezzant did not 
publish the Notice to influence the decisions of any government branch, but did so 
because Tom Hunter threatened to sue him, and to preserve his friendship and business 
relationship with Hunter, must not only be accepted as true, but are facts admitted on the 
record. R280:39-40; R385; R1457 (Br. Appt. Addendum G). 
Although Defendants now refer to the Notice as the "Editorial," this is a semantic 
manipulation of unfavorable facts to fit favorable law. Defendants entitled it the "Urgent 
Election Notice", the "Correction," and the "Apology" until Jacob filed his Complaint. 
Defendants now strategically avoid these titles. The Notice was published via mail, door-
to door delivery, and the non-editorial section of the Citizen's website. The undisputed 
facts that Hunter wrote the first draft and that both he and Storrs approved the final draft 
undermine any claim the Notice was an editorial, and further reveal Bezzant's claim that 
he was merely exercising his own free speech rights to be false on its face. Rl529-30. 
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That Bezzant maliciously identified "William T. (Bill) Jacob" and falsely accused 
him of producing false information and of negative campaigning to hurt candidates must 
also be accepted as true, as well as the reasonable inference that Bezzant intended to 
make Jacob a target of public ridicule, contempt, and hatred. R1529-30; R2609-10. 
Had the district court accepted Jacob's factual allegations3 as true and drawn all 
reasonable inferences in his favor, the court should have concluded the Act did not apply 
and that Jacob's claims had both legal and factual merit. Bezzant's failure to show the 
court's ruling was correct when accepting Jacob's allegations as true defeats his claims. 
A. Bezzant fails to show that a lengthy procedural history is clear and 
convincing evidence that Jacob's primary purpose was to interfere with or 
chill his right to participate in the process of government. 
The district court acknowledged Bezzant had to "demonstrate that the primary 
purpose of Jacob's lawsuit [was] 'to prevent, interfere with, or chill [Bezzant's] proper 
participation in the process of government.'" R1825:13 (quoting §78-58-104(2)). 
Bezzant had to make this showing by clear and convincing evidence (§78-58-104(l)(b)), 
which is obviously a greater burden than a mere preponderance standard. The district 
court's conclusion that this matter was a SLAPP action was based on the following: 
[T]he evidence presented to this Court intimates that Jacob filed the litigation at issue 
for the purpose of chilling Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or 
interfering with Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. The 
lengthy procedural history set forth in Section I of this opinion supports the 
proposition that Jacob intended to use this litigation as a means of punishing Bezzant 
for Bezzant's publication of the political speech contained in the election notice. 
3It is particularly appropriate for the district court accept all factual allegations as true 
because the anti-SLAPP Act stays all discovery upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Utah Code Ann . §78-58-104(l)(a). 
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R1825:14. A lengthy procedural history4 is not clear and convincing evidence of a 
primary purpose to interfere with or chill government participation; because Bezzant 
cannot argue that it is, he argues instead that Jacob's good faith is immaterial. BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 44-5. 
Moreover, many litigated cases are lengthy for legitimate reasons. A long history 
is often the rule rather than the exception and does not, standing alone, support a finding 
of abuse by either party. In fact, it may support the opposite finding as diligent litigants 
narrow the issues for trial. Cases settle all the time because litigants agree to avoid 
typically lengthy litigation and its associated costs. In any event, a lengthy procedural 
history is insufficient to establish a primary purpose to interfere with or chill Bezzant's 
right to participate in the process of government by clear and convincing evidence. 
B. Bezzant fails to address his own admissions that prove he was not 
participating in the process of government, arguing instead for a broad 
construction of the Act that exceeds its plain language and purpose. 
Bezzant's affirmations in his Answer that his Notice was published to provide 
"information and commentary" to American Fork City ("AFC") residents and to 
"apologize" to Hunter and Storrs (R385, fflf 16-20) constitute judicial admissions. 
4
 Not only is Bezzant's Statement of Facts inaccurate and misleading, he fails to inform 
the Court about his own significant contributions to the procedural history of this case. 
He was the first party to initiate and aggressively pursue costly discovery. See e.g. R26; 
R54; R56. Bezzant's Motion also should have been filed even before his Answer, not 
nearly two years (R426) after raising the Act as a defense. R385. Utah Code Ann. §78-
58-104 (a party files a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the district court must 
determine "as expeditiously as possible"). Bezzant's lengthy delay in filing his Motion, 
during which both parties' legal costs increased substantially, is his own fault, not 
Jacob's. While Jacob attempts herein to clarify additional facts Bezzant has 
5 
Bezzant also admitted he published the Notice to preserve a friendship and business 
relationship. R1457. Notwithstanding his hope that this Court will ignore these 
statements, they are admissions that summarily defeat his claim that his Notice was 
participation in the process of government, and now estop him from making that claim. 
Bezzant claimed Jacob's complaint was filed "as a retributive action designed to 
punish Bezzant's use of political speech and his legitimate participation in the political 
process." R1825:12 (emphasis added). This political activity, even if true, does not fall 
under the statutory definition for "process of government." This Court's analysis of the 
judicial privilege in O'Connor v. Burningham, supra, is analogous. For that privilege to 
apply, material must be presented in the course of a judicial proceeding; the material 
must have some reference to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding; and the party 
claiming the privilege must be acting in a recognized capacity in the judicial proceeding. 
Id. Similarly, for statements to be made in the "process of government," they must be 
presented as part of a legislative or executive proceeding; the statements must reference 
the subject matter of the government proceeding; and the individual making the 
statements must be acting in a recognized capacity in the proceeding. 
Bezzant's argument that an election is an activity leading up to future unknown 
government decisions is unpersuasive. He asks this Court to extend the meaning of 
"process of government" to statements that may have some unintended and unforeseen 
influence on future nebulous government decisions. This would require a broad 
misconstrued in his favor, to preserve needed space for argument, Jacob has attached 
Addendum C, a comparison between several of Bezzant's facts and the record. 
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construction of the term beyond its plain language and would be unwise. It would also 
violate rules of statutory construction. 
Because this Court will read the Act "as a whole and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other provisions of the statute and with other statutes under the same and 
related chapters" (Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f7, 162 P.3d 1099), Bezzant's Notice cannot 
be considered government participation as a matter of law. This is true even if the facts 
and their reasonable inferences are not construed in Jacob's favor. 
Section 78-58-102(2) defines "government" to include a branch or other 
government body, an employee, or a person acting in their official capacity. Notably, 
"government" does not include an election campaign or political speech. Section 78-58-
104(3) states, "Any government body to which the moving party's acts were directed or 
the attorney general may intervene to defend or otherwise support the moving party" 
(emphasis added). Interpreting these provisions in harmony with the statutory definition 
for "process of government," Bezzant's conduct had to be directed toward a branch, 
agency, department, or person acting in their official capacity for the Act to apply. 
Bezzant's Notice was not directed to any government branch or person acting in 
their official capacity, nor was it intended to influence any legislative or executive 
decision. As discussed in Jacob's opening brief, the fundamental purpose of anti-SLAPP 
legislation is to protect private citizens' rights to petition government by giving them a 
tool to defeat meritless lawsuits brought by large private interests for the sole purpose of 
chilling or interfering with that fundamental right. Bezzant asks this Court to extend the 
scope of the plain language of Utah's Act beyond this explicit purpose. 
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In his brief, Bezzant claims publication of the Notice constituted his proper 
government participation for three reasons unrelated to the fundamental right to petition 
government. First, he inaccurately5 claims the Notice "addressed a significant issue 
before American Fork City regarding the interpretation of its ordinances"; second, 
Bezzant claims the Notice "was directly responsive to Jacob's Flyer on the same subject 
which Jacob has expressly claimed to be his own participation in the process of 
government"; and third, the Notice "was published in the course of an election campaign" 
which would eventually lead up to government decisions. Br. Appe. at 23-4. 
None of these activities involve "process of government" nor do they involve the 
First Amendment right to petition government. Therefore, they hardly merit a response. 
The mere fact that a publication includes a legal issue does not bring it within the Act's 
scope, particularly when the legal issue is not even pending before a government body. 
Otherwise, every publication about abortion or gay rights, for example, would be deemed 
participation in the process of government. It would be both unwise and inaccurate to 
construe every such publication as an attempt to influence government decisions. If the 
Act encompassed every publication involving a public issue, whether or not it was 
responsive to another publication, it would chill potential litigants from seeking a judicial 
remedy for defamatory statements couched therein. Such a broad construction would 
exceed the purpose of the Act and be subject to abuse by would-be defamers. 
5
 Bezzant misconstrues this fact. Any government decision to ignore Hunter's and 
Storrs' conflicts of interest were made long before Bezzant published his Notice. 
Addendum C, YP, 5. Interpretation of the ordinances relating to Hunter's and Storrs' 
conflicts of interest was clearly not pending before the AFC government. 
8 
Bezzant's claim that the Notice constituted government participation because it 
was published during an election campaign argues for an overbroad definition that is 
anticipatory of future government decisions. Under his rationale, any publication that 
could have any unintended impact upon election outcomes would be government 
participation because election outcomes affect government decisions. So do births, 
deaths, marriages, divorces, career choices, and illicit encounters between state senators 
and private citizens in airport bathrooms. However, defamatory statements about private 
citizens made in these contexts are not included within the scope of the Act simply 
because they may have some unpredictable impact on future government decisions. 
Bezzant's "process of government" analysis is also misleading as he attempts to 
shoehorn unfavorable facts within the statutory definition. He claims the Notice was "an 
activity leading up to the decisions that would be made by the newly constituted City 
Council... he was [] influencing those decisions in the most direct way a citizen can - by 
engaging in political speech directed at who those decision-makers should be." Br. Appe. 
at 31. This self-serving claim suggesting an intent that Bezzant never had is misleading 
and false. R1457 (Br. Appt, Addendum G). 
Also inconsistent with the argument that his intent is immaterial (Br. Appe. at 28, 
44-5), Bezzant claims for the first time it is "undisputed" that he delivered the Notice to 
Mayor Ted Barratt, "the public official with the authority to enforce those Ordinances -
as well as the other members of the City Council." Br. Appe. at 25, 29. This new claim 
is both disputed and demonstrably false. R516, Tab E, 136-38 (Deposition testimony of 
9 
Ted Barratt that he did not discuss the Notice with anyone and he did not see it until after 
it was delivered to his home in the same manner it was delivered to other AFC residents). 
Thus, the delivery of Bezzant's Notice to the AFC mayor or other public officials 
was incidental, not intentional. Bezzant's contrary suggestion lacks candor. While his 
misconstruction of the facts is misleading, it also evidences the lack of factual support for 
a finding that Bezzant's Notice was intended to influence government decisions. 
Bezzant also relies upon the district court's factually unsupported finding that the 
Notice was directed to "those in the city's executive and legislative positions who had the 
power to disqualify candidates" (Br. Appe. at 25), which Jacob challenged in his opening 
brief. Bezzant's only response to Jacob's challenge is an unsupported assertion that it "is 
both factually incorrect and uncivil." Br. Appe. at 25. While Jacob intended no 
disrespect to the district court in pointing out there are no facts to support this 
inconsistent finding,6 Bezzant can cite no evidence to support it. 
Even the Rhode Island statute Bezzant mischaracterizes as "similar" to the Utah 
provision (Br. Appe. at 33) expressly precludes such abuse. While it is broader than the 
Utah Act because it gives conditional immunity for statements "made in connection with 
an issue of public concern," it does not protect statements that are a "sham." R.I. Gen. 
Laws §§9-33-1 and 9-33-2 (Addendum A). "Sham" statements are defined as: 
6
 The Notice was addressed, "To: All American Fork Residents" (Rl 825:9). "Bezzant's 
publication of the election notice was primarily directed to citizens of American Fork 
who had a direct interest in the upcoming election." R1825:16. AFC public officials 
testified there were no City Council discussions about the conflict of interest issue, and 
Ted Barratt refused to allow private citizens to discuss the issue during those meetings. 
R516, Tab E, at 109-1; see also, citations in Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Addendum C. 
10 
(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising 
the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in 
procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and 
(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the 
governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Use of outcome or 
result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the 
governmental process itself for its own direct effects. 
Under these provisions, not only would Bezzant's intent be highly significant, his 
statements are both objectively and subjectively baseless. He admittedly did not expect 
them to influence government decisions. R1457. That AFC government officially 
supported Hunter's and Starrs' candidacies while turning a blind eye to the conflicts of 
interest is undisputed. See, e.g., R516, Tab E, 109-10. Assuming without agreeing that 
"process of government" should encompass any statement about an election, Bezzant 
used that process not to influence government decisions, but to avoid being sued and to 
preserve his friendship and business relationship with the public official candidates. 
Therefore, Bezzant's Notice is a "sham" under the Rhode Island statute. 
Further, the Rhode Island case Bezzant cites, Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. 
Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000) (Addendum B), is inapposite to the facts here and 
further demonstrates how and when anti-SLAPP legislation is properly applied - when 
large and powerful private interests bring meritless lawsuits against private citizens to 
harass and intimidate them because they threaten their pecuniary interests. 
Global Waste was in continuing violation of government directives to clean up its 
property. It was improperly stockpiling hazardous construction waste and demolition 
material. Many local residents, spearheaded by Marcia and Henry Mallette, feared these 
11 
hazards were harming the community and signed a petition seeking government 
enforcement against Global Waste. When a fire broke out on the property spewing 
billows of black smoke into the surrounding community, a news reporter interviewed 
several local residents, including the Mallettes, who were quoted as saying Global Waste 
was burning lead and asbestos. Global Waste sued the Mallettes for defamation and lost 
on a motion for summary judgment brought under Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute. 
In upholding the district court's ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first 
reprimanded Global Waste for lying in their brief about their noncompliance and noted 
its violations were a well-documented matter of public concern. The Rhode Island court 
specifically found Global Waste's ongoing violations "might constitute an actionable 
private nuisance to the Mallettes and their neighbors." Id. at 1213. 
Unlike this case, Global Waste was a large private interest suing private citizens 
who had petitioned the government in a manner adverse to its pecuniary interests. The 
Mallettes comments, which were elicited during a highly publicized fire, did not 
unnecessarily identify a private citizen or make him an object of public contempt. Nor 
were they carefully crafted to preserve a friendship and business relationship. Unlike the 
Utah Act, the controlling statute in Global Waste expressly includes matters of public 
concern under its broad language. However, even under this broad language that is 
advisedly7 not a part of the Utah Statute, Jacob is not a matter of public concern. 
7
 In interpreting statutory language, it is assumed that each term was used advisedly. Sill 
v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^[11, 162 P.3d 1099. Had the Utah legislature intended matters of 
public concern to be included within the scope of proper participation in the "process of 
government," it would have said so. 
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Unlike the Mallettes, Bezzant ridiculed a private citizen to please AFC public 
officials. Bezzant's proposed broad construction of "process of government" exceeds the 
Act's plain language and its underlying purpose. Adopting it would create confusion in 
the law and a concomitant chilling effect on those who would otherwise legitimately seek 
redress for injuries to their reputations, in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (implicitly 
supporting a narrow construction of any statute restricting remedies to persons who have 
been injured in their reputation). 
Bezzant's anti-SLAPP counterclaim is an abuse of the intent and purpose of the 
Act. This dispute was never about what Bezzant said about Hunter or Storrs or the 
applicability of the AFC ordinances to their respective candidacies. This lawsuit was not 
designed to punish Bezzant's use of political speech or to chill or interfere with Bezzant's 
government participation. Had Bezzant not identified Jacob and called him a liar, there 
would be no complaint against Bezzant. But not naming Jacob would have defeated the 
primary purpose of the Notice, which was to appease Hunter and Storrs by exposing 
Jacob to public contempt, hatred and ridicule. The Act was never intended to shield such 
statements from liability. Rather than address his personal and unnecessary attack on 
Jacob, Bezzant attempts to hide behind the purported public issue. 
As a matter of fact and law, Bezzant was not participating in the process of 
government when he falsely accused Jacob of lying about the issues to harm candidates. 
These statements did not involve an exercise of free speech or the right to petition 
government. However, it is not Jacob's burden to prove Bezzant was not participating in 
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the process of government, even though he has. Rather, it is Bezzant's task to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that even when accepting all of Jacob's 
factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Bezzant's 
publication of the Notice was a proper participation in the process of government. Not 
only has Bezzant failed to meet this burden, he cannot meet it on these facts. 
Like the district court below, Bezzant has failed in his brief to construe all factual 
allegations and inferences in a light most favorable to Jacob. Accordingly, Bezzant has 
failed to meet his burden on this appeal. Jacob respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the district court's ruling and to find "process of government" does not encompass 
Bezzant's publication of the Notice. 
II. BEZZANT'S CONCESSION THAT JACOB'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT UNDER 
SEEGMILLER SUMMARILY DEFEATS BEZZANT'S ANTI-SLAPP 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
Bezzant concedes, "This Court's precedent on this issue [of whether the 
statements in this case are defamatory per se] is somewhat unclear." Br. Appe. at 41. 
Bezzant then minimizes this concession by referring to it as an "isolated point" that "may 
make for an interesting discussion[.]" Id at 41-2. Bezzant's admission that controlling 
precedent is unclear concedes the point. Jacob's claims had sufficient merit to preclude 
sanctions under §78-58-105. Bezzant's characterization of this conflict in the law as an 
"isolated point" is disingenuous. It was the focus of Bezzant's Motion and the basis for 
the district court's finding that Jacob's defamation and false light claims lacked legal 
merit. R1825:15. Thus, it was the basis for the court granting Bezzant's Motion under 
the anti-SLAPP Act. Id 
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Noting this Court's seemingly contradictory opinions in Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 
626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981),8 and Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), the 
district court incorrectly concluded Jacob's claims lacked any merit because this Court 
implicitly overruled Seegmiller with its subsequent dicta in Larson that libel per se 
"constitute^] allegations of criminal conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or 
operation of an unlawful business." Rl 825:15. However, Seegmiller is still good law. 
See, O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, ^ flO, 165 P.3d 1214 9 (citing Seegmiller). 
Bezzant has effectively conceded that under Seegmiller, Jacob's claims were not 
wholly lacking in merit. This concession requires reversal of the district court's rulings 
dismissing Jacob's complaint as a SLAPP action and awarding sanctions. 
III. ACCEPTING JACOB'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE AND DRAWING 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN HIS FAVOR, HIS §1983 CLAIMS HAVE 
MERIT AND THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS IN ERROR 
The district court dismissed Jacob's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, which were based on 
the allegation Bezzant acted under the direction of AFC public officials when he 
published the Notice, finding Bezzant was not acting under color of law. Id. at 21-3. The 
district court found Jacob had "not met the heightened pleadings standard applied to 
§1983 conspiracy claims" because his claims were "nothing more than conclusory 
8
 In Seegmiller, this Court explained that libel and slander per se are "distinct concepts" 
and that "libel is classified as per se if it contains defamatory words specifically directed 
at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and without the aid of 
intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injuries." Seegmiller at 977; see also 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975) ("to hold a person up to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or vocation, they are deemed 
actionable per se; and the law presumes that damages will be suffered therefrom"). 
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allegations that lack the requisite factual undergirding necessary to survive summary 
judgment." R1825:22 (citing Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000) (when a 
plaintiff alleges complicit action between private defendants and state officials, "mere 
conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the 
pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted 
action")). Jacob's pleadings meet this standard. 
Discovery was automatically stayed under the Act when Bezzant filed his Motion 
(R426) less than two months after Jacob's Amended Complaint was filed (which added 
§1983 claims against AFC public officials), making it particularly important for the 
district court to construe Jacob's factual allegations as true and to draw all reasonable 
inferences in his favor. However, the district court did not do so. 
Particularly, the district court found Jacob's averments that Storrs acted for his 
own pecuniary benefit undermined Jacob's claim that Storrs acted in his official capacity 
as an AFC councilman when he "convinced Bezzant to publish the alleged defamation." 
Rl 825:22. The district court further found that because Jacob alleged AFC public 
officials procured the Notice by coercive threats, Bezzant could not be implicated in the 
alleged conspiracy. Rl 825:22-3. Defendants have failed to demonstrate the district 
court's ruling is correct when accepting all of Jacob's factual allegations as true and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in Jacob's favor. 
Defendants cannot meet this burden on these facts. The district court's ruling also 
did not accept Jacob's allegations as true, nor construe all reasonable inferences in 
Jacob's favor. Rather, the district court speculated about genuinely disputed material 
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facts under a summary judgment standard. Had the district court correctly accepted 
Jacob's allegations as true, Jacob's §1983 claims would have survived Bezzant's Motion. 
Jacob extensively and in great detail alleged AFC public officials used private 
entities and individuals to abridge fundamental rights of AFC citizens, including Jacob, 
and public officials employed a "code of silence" to shield them from detection. R280:6; 
see also id at 13-18; see R280 generally. Jacob further alleged private individuals acting 
on behalf of AFC public officials were acting under color of state law, and his 
fundamental rights were violated through AFC's "use of the nongovernmental defendants 
Bezzant and Newtah" {id at 7-9). He also duly alleged both Hunter and Storrs were AFC 
public officials at all times relevant to his claims. Id. at 36. 
Jacob alleged AFC public officials, including Hunter and Storrs, abridged private 
citizens' fundamental rights in various ways including unlawful meetings with a private 
developer that were closed to the public, and this abuse was manifest as an ongoing 
pattern and policy as early as 1992. Id. at 12, 14, 17. Jacob quickly became a target in 
June 1997 during a City Council meeting when he attempted to question the City's 
closed-meeting decision to build a new City Hall Complex contrary to a prior publicly 
approved plan. Id. at 19. In July 1997, public official Storrs held a news conference with 
Defendant Newtah and falsely accused Jacob of "grilling" AFC Council members 
without factual basis. Id. at 21. Jacob was also attacked in a Newtah letter to the editor 
authored by an unknown "H Stillman" and publicly criticized by Hunter who was serving 
as an appointee to the City Board of Adjustments. Id. at 24, 35-6. To borrow a term 
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from Defendants, the list of AFC public officials' documented abuses against Jacob and 
other private citizens continues ad nauseum. See R280, generally; Br. Appe. at 19. 
It must be accepted as true that AFC public officials engaged in an ongoing 
practice of threats, intimidation, and retaliation against private citizens who legitimately 
questioned the legality of their activities. R280:19-25, 28. AFC public officials and 
those acting under their direction perpetuated a climate of fear and retaliation, and many 
AFC citizens, including Jacob and his wife, were harmed and feared for their safety; and 
it was the common practice of AFC public officials and their friends to violate the law 
when it suited their public and private ambitions. R280:20-9, 30-1, 33-7. Further, it is 
true and may be reasonably inferred that public officials engaged Bezzant and the Citizen 
as instruments in their ongoing retaliatory conduct against Jacob and other private 
citizens. R280:24-5, 27, 35.9 It is also true that Hunter and Storrs and other AFC public 
officials threatened and colluded with Bezzant in drafting and publishing the alleged 
defamatory Notice in an extraordinary effort to "blacken ... [Jacob's name] all over the 
state" (quoting Mayor Ted Barratt). R280:39-41. 
When an employee of the Citizen published an editorial entitled "A City In Fear," which 
discussed AFC public officials' use of AFC police to retaliate against private citizens, 
AFC public officials sent him a threatening message. R280:28-9; R1459. The public 
perception of the AFC police and their abuse was so terrible, it was the hot topic in the 
November 1997 AFC municipal election when Ted Barratt was elected as mayor only 
after promising an independent investigation of the police department. R280:29-30. 
When Jacob later requested documents relating to the promised investigation (which 
never was conducted), Mayor Barratt threatened Jacob and his family with having 
someone break into one of their homes and planting illegal contraband. R280:30-3. 
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Not only did Jacob allege in detail that Defendants acted on behalf and under the 
direction of AFC public officials Hunter and Storrs in publishing the Notice, but Bezzant 
himself admitted his agreement and willing complicity in that publication. R280:39; 
R1457 (Br. Appt. Addendum G). Construing these facts as true and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in Jacob's favor, he presented detailed facts tending to show 
agreement and concerted action between Bezzant and AFC public officials. 
Bezzant's failure to demonstrate how the district court's ruling is correct when 
construing these facts in Bezzant's favor is fatal to Bezzant's arguments on this appeal. 
Accordingly, Jacob's §1983 claims were sufficiently pled and the district court's award 
of attorneys fees and costs under §1988 was in error and an abuse of discretion. 
IV. BEZZANT MISSTATES BOTH THE LAW AND THE FACTS IN ARGUING 
JACOB'S CLAIMS FOR DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT WERE 
PROPERLY DISMISSED 
Bezzant cites Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) as supporting authority for his 
argument that his unnecessary and malicious statements about Jacob were protected 
because they were carefully imbedded within the context of purported political speech. 
The facts of that case are inapposite. Buckley was about the propriety of placing caps on 
campaign contributions. The Court stated, "A limitation on the amount of money a 
person may give to a candidate or campaign organization [] involves little direct restraint 
on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support 
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to 
discuss candidates and issues." Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court never 
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suggested alleged defamatory statements about private citizens strategically placed within 
the context of purported political speech should be immune from prosecution. 
Bezzant's statements about Jacob were not about either a candidate or a public 
issue. They were about a private citizen who wished to remain anonymous and had 
nothing to do with the correct interpretation of the City Ordinances. Bezzant never 
addresses the fact that it is not political speech that is at issue in this case. It is the 
alleged defamatory statements about a private individual that were completely 
unnecessary to the political issue Bezzant now seeks to hide behind.10 
A. Utah's public interest privilege does not immunize Bezzant from liability 
for deliberately harming Jacob's reputation. 
Jacob has never disputed that matters of public interest should be open for public 
debate. Jacob has only maintained that identifying him contrary to long-standing 
agreement and then publicly accusing him of lying and negative campaigning was 
unnecessary, malicious, and deliberately designed to hold him out as an object of public 
ridicule. In other words, Jacob is not "a matter of public interest." 
Bezzant does not spend a lot of time on this argument and for good reason. 
Bezzant concedes matters of public interest are limited to statements about "the 
functioning of governmental bodies, officials, or public institutions, or with respect to 
10
 Without citing to the record, Bezzant argues in a footnote that the district court granted 
his motion to dismiss both under the anti-SLAPP Act and for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted under Rule 12(c). Br. Appe. 34-5, fh. 8. However, the 
district court only discussed the Act and the alternative bases for dismissing Jacob's 
claims, with no mention of Rule 12(c). R1825. Moreover, Jacob's meritorious claims 
would not be dismissed under that rule. 
20 
matters involving the expenditure of public funds." Br. Appe. at 37 (citing Seegmiller). 
Bezzant's statements about Jacob, a private citizen, clearly do not fit within that 
limitation. If a private citizen is falsely accused of being a rapist or a liar within the 
context of a public debate about the correct interpretation of municipal ordinances, the 
public interest privilege was never intended to shield the defamer from liability. A 
malicious defamer cannot hide behind the First Amendment or the privileges created 
under it by couching hate-driven defamatory speech within a purported public issue. 
The district court concluded Utah's public interest privilege applied because the 
Notice was not excessively published and was not published with malice.11 Given the 
extraordinary measures Bezzant took to publish the Notice worldwide and the facts 
showing Bezzant's statements about Jacob were false and malicious, both in the sense 
they were mean-spirited and knowing, intentional and reckless, the district court's ruling 
is in error. Jacob made this argument in his opening brief. Br. Appt. 39-40. 
Bezzant conclusorily asserts Jacob has not sufficiently alleged malice then only 
briefly acknowledges those facts establishing malice (see e.g., Br. Appt. at 10-12, 18) 
when he argues his intent is immaterial. Br. Appe. 44-5. It must be accepted as true that 
the false statements in the Notice were not the result of Bezzant's careful research about 
Hunter's and Storrs' conflicts of interest; they were knowingly, intentionally, and 
recklessly published under the direction of Hunter and Storrs. Id. But even without 
accepting these allegations as true, the public interest privilege does not apply as a matter 
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of law because Bezzant's statements about Jacob were not an issue of public concern. 
Accordingly, the district court's ruling should be reversed. 
B. The Notice is not an editorial and the statements therein are verifiable. 
This section of Bezzant's brief is also short for a reason. The legal question of 
whether the City Ordinances at issue disqualified Hunter and Storrs from the election is 
certainly verifiable, as are the statements that Jacob deliberately misled the public to hurt 
the candidates and to engage in negative campaigning. Moreover, Jacob has maintained 
both below and throughout this appeal that the Notice was never an editorial and was 
only characterized as such in Bezzant's attempt to fit unfavorable facts within favorable 
law. Br. Appt. 41-2. Therefore, the district court's ruling should be reversed. 
C. The context of the malicious statements makes them defamatory, and they 
are defamatory per se because they accuse Jacob of lying and were 
designed to hold him out as an object of public contempt and ridicule. 
Whether Bezzant's statements about Jacob convey a defamatory meaning depends 
upon the context in which they were made. O 'Connor v. Burningham, supra. "Context" 
is defined as "the whole situation, background, or environment relevant to a particular 
event" (WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, Second College Edition (1980) at 307). 
The whole situation, background, and environment relevant to Bezzant's 
publication of the Notice was one of corrupt municipal public officials utilizing the local 
police force, news media, and other improper means to threaten and intimidate private 
citizens including Jacob. It was an environment where public officials hid their activities 
11
 See district court's analysis at R1825:16 (citing Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 
842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992)) where the court finds the privilege protected 
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from their constituents and supported candidates who were ineligible for public office 
under pertinent municipal ordinances, and who publicly and privately attacked any 
private citizen who raised questions about these activities. Further, Bezzant's Notice was 
published not to engage in protected First Amendment activity, but as a sham to further 
his own interests, which Bezzant admits. R 1457 (Br. Appt, Addendum D). 
Given this context of municipal corruption, abuse, and power mongering, 
Bezzant's self-serving and malicious statements about Jacob were and are defamatory. 
If Bezzant's true purpose were simply to engage in political speech, he would not have 
violated his long-standing agreement and disclosed Jacob's name. That disclosure was 
unnecessary to any alleged political debate but was a purposeful, malicious act calculated 
to harass and hurt Jacob. The accompanying false allegations that Jacob was a liar and 
negative campaigner were purposefully included to hold him out as an object of public 
hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Accordingly, the self-serving and abusive context 
surrounding Bezzant's statements makes them defamatory as a matter of law. 
V. BEZZANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
The parties' dispute on this issue centers on whether §78-58-105(l)(a) allows an 
award of attorneys fees not for bad faith or for filing claims wholly lacking in merit, but 
for not succeeding on the merits. Bezzant earnestly contends the statute requires no 
Bezzant's statements because they were not excessively published or with malice. 
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showing of bad faith (Br. Appe. at 44-5), which is inconsistent with his former position, 
but is consistent with his tendency to construe the most unfavorable facts and law in his 
favor. Thus, Bezzant argues, affidavits from Jacob's attorneys explaining how they 
assessed the merits of Jacob's claims in good faith are not relevant. Br. Appe. at 45. 
This is actually a compelling concession on Bezzant's part. He does not even 
argue Jacob filed his complaint in bad faith. Nor can he. Rather, Bezzant effectively 
concedes that when Jacob filed his complaint for the alleged primary purpose of chilling 
Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government, this Court can assume he did 
so in good faith. Id. This concession makes no sense, particularly given the nearly 
$200,000 that Jacob has been sanctioned for filing his complaint in the first place. 
At a minimum, it is bad policy to severely sanction a party not for bad faith, which 
Bezzant concedes is not a factor here, but for not accurately predicting the outcome of a 
good faith dispute. Bezzant asks this Court to conclude that a lack of success on the 
merits, not bad faith, is evidence of a primary purpose to interfere with or chill a 
defendant's right to participate in government processes. Bezzant cannot have it both 
ways. He cannot argue Jacob's motive in filing his complaint was both improper and in 
good faith. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs or Defendants ultimately prevail on the 
merits, Jacob has demonstrated from the beginning that his claims have at least some 
merit and are not so wholly lacking in merit that sanctions are appropriate. Accordingly, 
the district court's award of attorneys fees was improper and should be reversed. 
12
 See, R3069:90 (Bezzant's counsel argued, "When you get attorney's fees is under that 
105 portion of the statute which require you to prove additional elements, essentially bad 
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VI. BEZZANT MISCONSTRUES JACOB'S ARGUMENT UNDER THE OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE AND THUS FAILS TO REBUT IT 
Bezzant appears to misunderstand Jacob's argument under the Open Courts 
clause. Jacob did not ask this Court to strike the anti-SLAPP Act as unconstitutional. 
Rather, he argued the Act was unconstitutional because it violates Utah's Open Courts 
clause as applied to these facts. Br. Appt. at 43-7 (arguing the Act is unconstitutional as 
applied because it abrogates Jacob's remedy for harm to his reputation and because the 
evil the Act was designed to eliminate does not exist here). Therefore, Bezzant has failed 
to rebut Jacob's as-applied arguments, which thus continue to stand on their own merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants have failed to meet their burden on this appeal. Plaintiffs respectfully 
request this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and to remand this matter for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2007. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Jenifer KfG owans 
Attorneys for Appellant 
&m^ 
faith and no legal good faith basis for bringing the claim."). 
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TITLE 9. COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE-PROCEDURE GENERALLY 
CHAPTER 33. LIMITS ON STRATEGIC LITIGATION AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Go to the Rhode Island Code Archive Directory 
R.I. Gen. Laws §9-33-1 (2007) 
§9-33-1. Findings 
The legislature finds and declares that full participation by persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues 
of public concern before the legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies and in other public fora are essential to the 
democratic process, that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of 
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances; that such litigation is disfavored 
and should be resolved quickly with minimum cost to citizens who have participated in matters of public concern. 
HISTORY: P.L. 1993, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 448, § 1. 
NOTES: 
LAW REVIEWS. 2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
1. Constitutionality. 
2. Freedom of Speech. 
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
This chapter is constitutional. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.L 1996). 
2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH. 
Since a citizen's letters to the editor of a newspaper voicing his opinion on a public school construction project were 
exercises of free speech, summary judgment in favor of the citizen was appropriate as to the Limits on Strategic 
Litigation Against Public Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 et seq. defense to the political 
representative's libel and false light suit. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.L 
2004). 
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TITLE 9. COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE-PROCEDURE GENERALLY 
CHAPTER 33. LIMITS ON STRATEGIC LITIGATION AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Go to the Rhode Island Code Archive Directory 
R.L Gen. Laws § 9-33-2 (2007) 
§ 9-33-2. Conditional immunity 
(a) A party's exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island 
constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, 
counterclaims, or cross-claims. Such immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section, except if the petition or free speech 
constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring 
favorable government action, result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. The petition or free speech 
will be deemed to constitute a sham as defined in the previous sentence only if it is both: 
(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could 
realistically expect success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and 
(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its 
own direct effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the governmental 
process itself for its own direct effects. 
(b) The court shall stay all discovery proceedings in the action upon the filing of a motion asserting the immunity 
established by this section; provided, however, that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, 
may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the 
order ruling on the motion. 
(c) The immunity established by this section may be asserted by an appropriate motion or by other appropriate 
means under the applicable rules of civil procedure. 
(d) If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established by this section, or if the party claiming lawful 
exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in 
connection with a matter of public concern is, in fact, the eventual prevailing party at trial, the court shall award the 
prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the motion and any related discovery 
matters. The court shall award compensatory damages and may award punitive damages upon a showing by the 
prevailing party that the responding party's claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims were frivolous or were brought with 
an intent to harass the party or otherwise inhibit the party's exercise of its right to petition or free speech under the 
United States or Rhode Island constitution. Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of the party claiming 
lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions to 
any remedy otherwise authorized by law. 
(e) As used in this section, "a party's exercise of its right of petition or of free speech" shall mean any written or 
oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental 
proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2 
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legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; or any written or oral statement made in 
connection with an issue of public concern. 
HISTORY: P.L. 1993, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 448, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 386, § 1. 
NOTES: 
LAW REVIEWS. 2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
1. Assertion of Immunity. 
2. Sham Petitions. 
3. Right of Petition. 
4. Zoning Appeals. 
1. ASSERTION OF IMMUNITY. 
The "appropriate motion" or "or other appropriate means" described in the 1995 amendment of subsection (c) is a 
motion for summary judgment that will allow the hearing justice to consider information extrinsic to the pleadings. 
Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). 
Since a citizen's letters to the editor of a newspaper voicing his opinion on a public school construction project were 
exercises of free speech, summary judgment in favor of the citizen was appropriate as to the Limits on Strategic 
Litigation Against Public Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 et seq. defense to the political 
representative's libel and false light suit. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.I. 
2004). 
2. SHAM PETITIONS. 
The legislature intended the 1995 amendment to clarify and not to cloud the material provisions of this section, and 
intended that the term "tortious conduct" in the 1993 act be synonymous with the term "sham petitioning" in the 1995 
amendment. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d56 (R.I. 1996). 
3. RIGHT OF PETITION. 
In a suit by the owners of a city landfill against a city resident alleging tortious interference with contractual relations 
and defamation, the defendant's written statements, submitted to an executive body as well as to legislators, were made 
in connection with an issue under consideration by the Department of Environmental Management and in connection 
with an issue of public concern, namely potential environmental contamination resulting from the plaintiffs activities, 
and therefore clearly constituted an exercise of her right of petition and free speech within the meaning of subsection 
(e). Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). 
4. ZONING APPEALS. 
Since the plaintiff presented insufficient facts and allegations to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
defendant had probable cause to appeal a zoning amendment to the Superior Court, and, at trial, the defendant presented 
expert and lay testimony in support of its position, the defendant's appeal of the zoning decision was not objectively 
baseless, and the appeal was not a "sham" that would bar the conditional immunity provided by this section. Cove Rd. 
Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. ParkAssocs., 674 A.2d 1234 (R.I. 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES. Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by state courts. 94 A.L.R.5th 455. 
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LEXSEE762 A.2I) • ••* 
Glnhul \\ \\s W HIM \ dun- linn \ I  I* Mfallette, Ji ., et al. 
No. 98-597-AppeaI. 
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND 
1208; 2000 HI LEXIS 224 
December 14, 2000, Decided 
December 14, 2000, Opinion Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [" M] Appeal !r ; * iperioi 
Court. Kent County. Hurst, J. (KC-97-710). 
DISPOSITION: "W e deny and dismiss Global's 
appeal, affirm the summary judgment in favor of the 
Mallettes, and the award of counsel fees made to counsel 
for the Mallettes for services rendered in the Superior 
Court. 
MIDGES: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, and 
Goldberg, JJ., concurring. Flanders J., did not attend oral 
arguments, but participated on the basis of the briefs. 
OPINION 
[* 1208] OPINION 
Bourcier, Justice. In this case Global Waste 
Recycling, Inc. (Global), the plaintiff below, appeals 
from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant on its Superior Court civil action in which 
Global had sought both "economic damages" as well as 
punitive damages from the defendants, Henry and 
Marcia Mallette. 
On appeal, Global contends that the trial justice 
erred in granting summary judgment after finding that its 
civil action was barred by virtue of the provisions of 
G.L. 1956 chapter 33 of title 9, the Strategic Litigation 
Against Public Participation statute (the anti-SLAPP 
statute). We reject Global's contention and affirm the 
grant of summary judgment. 
[*1209] I 
Case Facts/Travel 
Since June 30, 1995, Global [**2] has been, 
operating an unlicensed construction and demolition 
debris recycling facility located in an area that is zoned 
for residential use on Colvintown Road in the Town of 
Coventry. Global has been permitted to operate its debris 
recycling facility there pursuant to a consent judgment 
and operation plan entered on June 30, 1995, between the 
state Department of Environmental Management (DEM), 
Bettez Recycling, Inc., Bettez Construction Company, 
Inc., (Bettez), and Global. Some background information 
concerning the property site in question is helpful. 
From 1981 until 1989, Tri County Sand and Gravel, 
Ii ic, had operated a construction and demolition debris 
recycling facility on the land. During that time it had 
permitted large stockpiles of unsold debris and materials 
to accumulate on the site. In March 1990, Bettez began 
operating an unlicensed landfill on the property. 
Following complaints and on-site inspections, the DEM, 
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials, issued notices 
of violation. Following DEM hearings on the violation 
notices, Bettez was ordered by a final DEM agency 
decision, entered on March 5, 1991, to "cease receiving 
materials, dispose of the materials on site [**3] and pay 
an administrative remedy to the DEM." Bettez filed an 
administrative appeal from that DEM final decision in 
the Kent County Superior Court. 
While that administrative appeal was pending, 
Global became interested in operating a construction and 
demolition debris recycling facility on the Bettez 
property site and moved to intervene in Bettez's pending 
appeal. Once in the case, Global then undertook to 
negotiate a settlement with DEM. On June 30, 1995, a 
negotiated settlement was reached. The settlement was 
evidenced by a consent judgment that included an 
operating plan in which Global would be permitted to 
operate a construction and demolition debris recycling 
facility on the Bettez site. The operating plan that was 
spelled out in the consent judgment contained several 
conditions that Global was required to comply with and 
perform. The operation plan, however, did not constitute 
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a DEM license for the operation; instead, it was in the 
nature of a conditional permit that required, among other 
obligations, for Global to immediately process 75 
percent of the six then-existing on-site stockpiles of 
demolition materials left there by Bettez. In addition, 
Global was required to furnish [**4] DEM with a 
closure fund and to comply with all applicable state, 
federal and local requirements, including any new 
regulations for licensing and regulation of recycling and 
solid waste management facilities. 
On December 16, 1996, Global was notified by the 
DEM Office of Waste Management that violations of 
Global's Waste Recycling Operation Plan were observed 
following a site inspection by DEM officials on 
December 12, 1996. One of those alleged violations 
concerned "substantial quantities of processed 
construction and demolition material" being left on the 
site. Those expanding construction and demolition 
material stockpiles had also been observed by many of 
the local residents living in the area, including Henry 
Mallette, Jr. and his wife, Marcia Mallette, whose 
residence unfortunately adjoins the Global site. As the 
Global stockpiles expanded, so did the Mallette's concern 
over the possibility of contamination of their well water, 
of airborne pollutants from composted materials left on 
the site, and the fire hazard created by the stockpiled 
demolition debris. The Mallettes, joined by some forty-
two other similarly alarmed Colvintown Road residents, 
filed a petition with the Coventry [**5] Town Council 
seeking relief from Global's expansion of those 
conditions at its facility. That petition was presented to 
the town council in mid July, 1997. The Mallettes, 
however, were not present at the council meeting. 
[*1210] As was feared and anticipated by the 
Colvintown Road residents, including the Mallettes, on 
July 30, 1997, a fire did break out on Global's site. 
Counsel for Global, in attempting to minimize the 
significance of that incident, has described that fire as 
being "a small fire *** that was extinguished in less than 
one hour." That description is certainly at great odds with 
that recounted by the Coventry fire chief and the 
Coventry police, who were at the scene, and who 
described the fire as breaking out "shortly after 5 p.m." 
and throwing heavy "dark blackish-blue smoke" over the 
area and prompting the necessity of "fire trucks from 
Washington, Western Coventry, Chopmist Hill, 
Potterville, West Greenwich, Scituate, Hope Jackson, 
Mishnock, West Greenwich [sic], Nooseneck Hill, 
Hianloland and North Smithfield fire departments." The 
Coventry fire chief informed the local press that 
firefighters "had to break [the pile of wood] up with 
bulldozers" and were required [**6] to douse the pile 
with water and "class A foam." The firefighters were 
unable to control and extinguish the fire until 7:30 p.m. 
During the ongoing fire, a news reporter from the 
local Kent County Daily Times newspaper spoke with 
and interviewed several of the many local residents at the 
fire scene. One of those persons interviewed was Henry 
Mallette, Jr., one of the two defendants in this case. 
Mallette is reported to have said, "who knows what 
they're burning over there. They say its mulch, but I 
know what it is. It's lead and asbestos and every other 
thing." l Some eight days later, while the newspaper was 
doing follow-up stories on Global's operation and the 
ongoing neighborhood concern over Global's operation 
of its yet unlicensed construction and demolition debris 
recycling facility, one of its reporters spoke with Marcia 
Mallette, Henry's wife, and codefendant. She told the 
reporter that "old homes are taken in there and piled up, 
they just sit there. I don't think any recycling is going 
on." 2 Her comment, along with that of others, was 
reported in the Kent County Daily Times on August 9, 
1997. 
1 Mallette, in an affidavit, says he was 
misquoted. He states that he told the reporter 
"God knows what's burning. There's lead and 
asbestos and who knows what else in those 
piles." 
[**7] 
2 On January 31, 1997, the Mallettes had 
received a copy of DEM's letter to Global 
advising Global that among other noted site 
inspection deficiencies, that its DEM 
"inspector noted that substantial 
quantities of processed 
construction and demolition 
material is not leaving the site. 
Please be advised that if this 
material is not reused then this 
office regards the material as 
discarded in a manner as to 
constitute the unpermitted disposal 
of solid waste. Please provide this 
Office with documentation which 
indicates that the material is being 
recycled." 
Three days later, on August 12, 1997, Global 
initiated a civil action for defamation against the 
Mallettes, claiming that its construction and demolition 
recycling business and reputation had been destroyed by 
the publication of the Mallettes' statements in the Kent 
County Daily Times. Global sought both "economic 
damages" as well as punitive damages from the 
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Mallettes, Four months later, on December 8, 1997, a 
Superior Court hearing justice granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Mallettes after finding that 
Global's action [**8] constituted an attempt by Global to 
silence legitimate statements on a matter of public 
concern. An interlocutory order reflecting that finding 
was entered on January 12, 1998 Thereafter, on April 
23, 1998, following a hearing on the Mallettes' request 
for counsel fees, an order awarding counsel fees against 
Global was entered and final judgment in the case 
entered on that same day. Global's appeal followed on 
May 5, 1998. 
II 
The Anti-SLAPP Statute 
In Hometown Properties, Inc. v. F leming, 680 A. 2d 
56 (R I 1996), this Court had [*1211] occasion to 
construe for the first time the provisions of chapter 33 of 
title 9, as enacted by P.L. 1993, ch. 354, being entitled 
"Limits on Strategic Litigation Against Public 
Participation" (the anti-SLAPP statute or the act). 
In Hometown we determined the act to be 
constitutional, and intended to emulate the federal Noerr-
Pennington doctrine 3 by providing conditional immunity 
to any person exercising his or her right of petition or 
free speech under the United States or Rhode Island 
Constitution concerning matters of public concern. That 
conditional immunity, we held, would render the 
petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims [**9] 
for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue 
of being objectively or subjectively baseless. Section 9-
33-2(a) of the anti-SLAPP statute defines a sham 
statement or petition as being one that is: 
"(I) Objectively baseless in the sense 
that no reasonable person exercising the 
right of speech or petition could 
realistically expect success in procuring 
the government action, result, or outcome, 
and 
"(2) Subjectively baseless in the 
sense that it is actually an attempt to use 
the governmental process itself for its 
own direct effects. Use of outcome or 
result of the governmental process shall 
not constitute use of the governmental 
process itself for its own direct effects." 
3 United Mine Workers oj America v. 
Pennington 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L 
Ed, 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S. 
127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed 2d 464 (1961). See 
also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 US, 49, 
113S Ct. 1920, 123 L. Ed 2d 611 (1993). 
[**10] 1 he Mallettes, in their answer to Global's 
complaint, raised the issue of their conditional immunity 
provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly 
moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 
56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 
The Superior Court motion hearing justice, after 
considering the Mallettes' motion for summary judgment, 
and after viewing the case pleadings and affidavits in the 
light most favorable to Global and against the Mallettes 
(see LaFratta v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 
751 A.2d 1281, 1283 (R.I 2000)), found that the 
Mallettes' statements were neither objectively sham nor 
actionable in light of the immunity protection afforded 
those statements by virtue of § 9-33-2. The hearing 
ritict riot' -1 
"In the instant case, the Mallettes made 
comments or remarks about an issue 
which was clearly one of public concern. 
Not only is the operation of a 94 acre 
recycling plant on its face a matter of 
concern, the issue of this recycling was 
and had been a matter of public concern. 
It had been the subject of D.E.M. 
proceedings as well as a petition 
presented to the local Town Council 
Pollution and environmental [**11] 
contamination is a matter of concern to 
the public as well as to the residents of the 
communities in which the recycling plant 
and landfill are operated. This is 
unquestionable. 
"The Mallettes' remarks were typical 
of those frequently made by citizens, 
taxpayers, neighbors or other residents of 
the community who wish to spark or spur 
governmental action or to otherwise 
obtain a satisfactory resolution of their 
concerns. Making loud and public 
complaints to newspaper reporters is a 
frequently used method for members of a 
community to affect local matters of 
interest or concern. Members of the public 
and residents of neighborhoods often use 
the news media as a forum for 
communicating their concerns to 
whatever governmental authorities may 
have an interest in or power over the 
matter at hand. This method is frequently 
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successful in achieving a response from 
local town administrators to governors, to 
legislators to presidents. Concerning the 
American experience, it's undoubtedly 
[*1212] realistic to expect some success 
in securing a governmental response when 
this method is utilized. 
"Considering the undisputed facts 
material to the issues raised by the 
motion, the criteria for objective 
baselessness [**12] is not met. The 
remarks are not objectively baseless in the 
sense that no reasonable person exercising 
the right of free speech could realistically 
expect some success. Given that the 
remarks were also based on the Mallettes' 
personal observations as well as the 
history of information gleaned from the 
D.E.M., any expectation that favorable 
governmental action or outcome to be had 
here could not be deemed to be 
unreasonable. 
"The motion for summary judgment 
is granted. The Mallettes are entitled to 
conditional immunity. The remarks were 
not objectively baseless." 
Ill 
Global's Appellate Contentions 
On appeal, Global challenges the propriety of the 
motion hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Mallettes. Global asserts here that (a) the 
policy of the anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to bar 
claims for tortious actions brought by a litigant who has 
"suffered actual economic injuries from baseless attacks 
upon [its] business reputation;" (b) the statements by the 
Mallettes were not made at a "judicial, administrative or 
legislative proceeding;" and (c) that the term "issues of 
public concern as contained in the anti-SLAPP statute is 
void as being unconstitutionally [** 13] vague." 
This Court, when reviewing the grant of a motion 
for summary judgment does so on a de novo basis. See 
Macera Brothers of Cranston, Inc. v. Gelfuso & Lachut, 
Inc., 740 A.2d 1262, 1264 (HL 1999) (per curiam). In the 
case at bar, we have reviewed the case pleadings and 
affidavits submitted by the Mallettes as well as other 
case file materials and have done so in a light most 
favorable to Global to determine if the Mallettes were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See 
Truk-Away of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 723 A.2d 309, 313 (R.I. 1999). Following 
that review, we are convinced that the hearing justice did 
not err and that summary judgment in favor of the 
Mallettes was appropriate. We conclude that Global's 
appellate issues, cleverly fashioned to misstate both 
material facts as well as the provisions of § 9-33-2(a), 
are without merit.4 
4 Global's contention was prefaced by its 
alerting us that "this Court should be aware that 
at no time prior to the statements being made [by 
the Mallettes] was Global going through any 
form of permitting or licensing process * * * with 
any state * * * agency." (Emphasis added.) That 
contention is factually erroneous. A letter dated 
July 7, 1997, to Global from Leo Hellested, DEM 
Supervising Engineer, Office of Waste 
Management, a copy of which is contained in the 
Mallettes' affidavit, sets out clearly that as a result 
of earlier site inspections of Global's facility by 
DEM, it was "noted that a substantial quantity of 
processed construction and demolition material 
continues to be stockpiled on the site." 
Additionally, DEM, in its letter, noted: 
"Also please be reminded, as we 
discussed during the May 
inspection, that the Department is 
still awaiting a revised license 
application submittal that more 
completely addresses all of the 
requirements of the revised Rules 
and Regulations for Composting 
Facilities and Solid Waste 
Management Facilities, January, 
1997." (Emphasis added and in the 
original.) 
Earlier, on December 16, 1996, DEM had 
notified Global of its "substantial quantities of 
processed construction and demolition material" 
that were not being removed from Global's 
facility and which could be regarded as 
"unpermitted disposal of solid waste." Judith 
Sine, a DEM engineer, also noted that Global 
recently had acquired a "new shredder and 
screen" and that pursuant to the June 30, 1995 
consent judgment (section 5-C), under which 
Global was permitted to operate its facility, 
Global was required to submit any proposed 
expansion of its site equipment to DEM for 
approval, and for amendment to the Operation 
Plan provided for in the consent judgment. Thus, 
contrary to what Global has asserted to us, both 
in its appellate brief and at oral argument, there 
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was indeed both ongoing Global licensing and 
permit proceedings at the time the Mallettes' 
statements were made. 
[**14] •*';.[.>! -
i.t:r;«, .i, ib initial and rather rhetorically phrased 
4 c lug appellate contention, asserts that the legislative 
policy embodied within our anti-SLAPP statute never 
was intended to bar civil actions brought by a litigant 
who has "suffered actual economic injuries from baseless 
attacks upon [its] business reputation." That contention 
would have merit if the facts in this case were such as to 
warrant any inference that the statements made by the 
Mallettes and concerning Global's operation of its 
construction and demolition debris recycling business 
were "baseless" or sham statements when made. 
However, that is not the case here. 
The motion hearing justice specifically found that 
the statements made by the Mallettes were not 
objectively baseless and thus, not sham and, as a result, 
Global's suit was barred pursuant to the express 
immunity provisions of § 9-33-2(a). Because our de 
novo review of the case filings and affidavits leads us to 
that same conclusion, we reject Global's initial appellate 
assertion of error as being meritless. 
(1 *) 
As to Global's next contention that "the invocation 
of the immunity provided by the anti-SLAPP statute" 
requires that the statement or [**15] statements for 
which immunity is claimed, "must be made before some 
type of legislative, judicial or administrative body" and 
"not to the public via the print media," such contention is 
both novel and meritless. 
W e noted in Hometown Properties, Inc., that the 
Legislature's clear intention for enacting the anti-SLAPP 
statute in 1993 was to allow the "full participation by 
persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues 
of public concern before the legislative, judicial, and 
administrative bodies, and in other public fora." 680 A.2d 
at 61 (quoting § 9-33-1). (Emphasis added.) Section 9-
33-1 of the anti-SLAPP statute makes clear the 
Legislature's disfavor of lawsuits brought primarily to 
"chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech" by persons making public statements 
in connection with an issue of public concern. Section 9~ 
33-1 not only encourages but also to protects "robust 
discussion of issues of public concern" in the "public 
fora." In 1995, the Legislature specifically amended § 9-
33-2 to provide explicit immunity to persons and 
organizations making statements not objectively or 
subjectively baseless in the [**16] course of robust 
discussion of public concern. P.I 1995, ch. 386, § 1. 
In this case, we are satisfied that the hearing justice 
carefully reviewed and considered whether the 
statements made by the Mallettes were objectively 
baseless. She found that they were not, and that the 
immunity from suit provided by the anti-SLAPP statute 
protected the Mallettes from Global's alleged defamation 
claims. We also have reviewed the hearing record and 
case filings and likewise conclude that the statements by 
the Mallettes were not objectively baseless and were thus 
entitled to immunity from civil suit as provided for in § 
9-33-2(a). Indeed, we additionally observe that the 
facility, as found to be conducted by Global, whether 
licensed, permitted, or in operation before the Mallettes 
and their neighbors moved to Colvintown Road, actually 
might constitute an actionable private nuisance to the 
Mallettes and their neighbors.5 See, e.g., Weida v. Ferry, 
493 A.2d824, 826-27 (R.I. 1985). 
5 The stockpiles, without an adequate closure-
fund as required by DEM, apparently still remain 
on Global's site. See Reitsma v. Global Waste 
Recycling, Inc., C.A. KC-57. 
[**17] (C) 
Global's final appellate
 contention is that the term 
"issues of public concern" contained in § 9-33-2(a) is 
"overly broad, ambiguous and without a definable, 
concrete meaning" and thus "in violation of the due 
process clauses of both the Rhode [*1214] Island and 
\ Jnited States Constitution" requires but scant 
consideration 
We respond to that constitutional challenge in two 
ways. First, the term "issues of public concern" is not so 
"overly broad, ambiguous and without a definable, 
concrete meaning," as contended by Global, excepting 
perhaps only to Global. That phrase and wording, we 
point out, enjoys a long, distinguished and unchallenged 
career in both state and civil defamation actions as well 
in tortious conduct actions, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. 
Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed 2d 708 (1983); Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 181 1, 29 L Ed 
2d 296 (1971); Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205, Will County, 391 
U.S. 563, 88 S Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968); Smith 
v. Fruin 28 F3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1994); [**18] 
Vukadinovich v. Bartels 853 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir. 
1988); Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622, 
627 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Caron v. Silvia, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 
271, 588 N.E2d 711, 714 (Mass. App.Ct. 1992); Burkes 
v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d309, 517N.W.2d 503, 510 (Wis* 
1994), 
Secondly, we observe, as did the motion hearing 
justice, that Global both failed and neglected to comply 
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with its clear obligation when challenging the 
constitutionality of a state statute to "serve the attorney 
general with a copy of the proceedings within such time 
to afford the attorney general an opportunity to 
intervene." Super. R. Civ. P. 24(d). See also G.L. 1956 § 
9-30-11. We do not believe that this Court should 
undertake to determine the constitutionality of a state 
statute in a given case without first affording the 
Attorney General the opportunity to intervene and be 
heard. See Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A. 2d 651, 654 
(R.I. 1990). 
For the reasons herein above set out, we deny and 
dismiss Global's appeal, affirm the summary judgment in 
favor of the Mallettes, and the award of counsel fees 
made to counsel for the [**19] Mallettes for services 
rendered in the Superior Court. 
Before we remand the papers in this case to the 
Superior Court, we direct counsel for the Mallettes to 
furnish this Court with a detailed request for counsel fees 
and any costs relating to this appeal, and direct that a 
copy thereof be submitted to counsel representing 
Global. This Court will, after consideration of counsel's 
request and any objection filed thereto, award an 
appropriate fee to Mallettes' counsel for his appellate 
representation of the Mallettes. 
Justice Flanders did not attend oral arguments, but 
participated on the basis of the briefs. 

COMPARISON OV UKZZANJ S FACTS TO THE RECORD 
The following list is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but does 
respond to some of Bezzant's most glaring misrepresentations of the facts 
1. Bezzant claims Jacob is a "wealthy businessman ana real estate 
developer" (Br. Appe at 5), citing the district court's ruling granting 
Bezzant's motion for summary judgment (Rl 825:7-9) and his own 
memorandum in support of his Motion (R515:viii-xi). This claim is 
false and there are no facts on the record to support it. Jacob is a 
businessman but is not a real estate developer. 
2. Bezzant claims tins matter was delayed wnen Jacob opposed "his own 
counsel's motion to withdraw, attempting to 'consolidate' this case with 
a massive class action filed on behalf of every citizen in American Fork, 
violating a stay on discovery, and eventually refusing to appear with 
new counsel for nearly a year." Br. Appe. at 5 (emphasis in original; 
citing the district court's ruling and Bezzant's own pleadings). These 
allegations are very misleading. Jacob's former counsel, not Jacob, 
fought his own firm's motion to withdraw from the case. R582, R607. 
Bezzant also fails to acknowledge his own strategically complicit role in 
moving to disqualify Jacob's former counsel. R582, R642. Iliis 
internal dispute was really between Jacob's former counsel and his own 
firm. Id. In a nutshell, Jacob's former counsel had represented him in 
this matter for several months when his firm decided to seek business 
from parties with interests adverse to Jacob's. R582. Further, Jacob 
never violated the stay on discovery. Jacob had a court order from 
federal Judge Paul Cassell allowing him to take the deposition of AFC 
public official, Don Hampton, in a separate case. As a courtesy, Jacob 
provided notice of that deposition in this case also because the cases 
were related. Further, Bezzant's claim that this matter was delayed 
because Jacob refused "to appear with new counsel for nearly a year" is 
both knowingly and blatantly false; Bezzant took aggressive and 
ultimately successful measures to disqualify Jacob's former counsel in a 
strategic and hotly litigated tactic to deprive Jacob of counsel, 
unnecessarily increase both parties' costs, and unnecessarily delay this 
matter. Id. To now blame Jacob for that dispute truly lacks candor. 
Bezzant falsely claims that interpretation of the AFC ordinances 
underlying the dispute in this case was a debate that "came to a head in 
the days before the 1999 election and has required periodic decisions 
and interpretations by the City Attorney, Mayor, and City Council" (Br. 
Appe. at 7, citing his own pleadings). This statement is very 
misleading. The truth is interpretation of the ordinances was not a 
pending issue before AFC public officials as they had already decided to 
ignore any conflicts of interests created by Tom Hunter's and Ricky 
Storrs' candidacies. R516, Tab H (Deposition of Ricky Storrs), at 100, 
112 (Storrs, who was an AFC councilman since 1991, testified he did 
not remember the conflict of interest issue ever coming up in AFC 
council meetings); at 129 (Storrs testified that Bezzant called and told 
him about the Notice, then Storrs received a copy like every other AFC 
citizen; he had no other discussions with anyone about the subject); at 
130 (Storrs testified, "I seen it [the Notice] when [it] went around the 
door steps as a flyer."); at 152 (Storrs reiterated he had no other 
discussions with anyone about the Notice); R516, Tab E at 141 (Ted 
Barratt testified there were no discussions about the Notice). 
On pages 14 and 15 of Bezzant's brief, he cites R1285:5, R1969:l 1, and 
R2463:ix-x, in support of his claim that federal Judge Paul Cassell 
terminated a deposition due to Jacob's former counsel asking "irrelevant 
and harassing" questions. While Jacob adamantly denies that his former 
counsel's questions in any deposition taken in this matter were 
irrelevant or intended to harass anyone, Bezzant's record citations are 
suspect. He cites R1285:5 does not exist, R1969:l 1 which is Bezzant's 
own memorandum in support of his motion for partial summary 
judgment, and R2463:ix-x, which is Bezzant's reply memorandum in 
support of his motion for partial summary judgment. 
Bezzant references the deposition testimony of AFC Mayor Ted Barratt 
in support of his claim that both the Flyer and the Notice were 
referenced in "a public City Council meeting after the publication of the 
Editorial in the days before the election." Br. Appe. at 30. The 
referenced testimony not only does not support Bezzant's assertions, it 
rebuts them. When asked if he discussed the contents of the Notice with 
anyone after receiving it, Barratt testified, "Not that I necessarily recall. 
I may have spoken with Councilman Tom Hunter and Councilman Elect 
Rick Storrs, but I don't recall those conversations at this time." R516, 
Tab E, at 141. While there was some discussion in the press after the 
election about the purported conflict of interest in relation to Hunter and 
Storrs holding public office, as both Barratt and Storrs testified in their 
depositions, this was never an issue of public debate in AFC Council 
Meetings. R516,TabE, 141;R516,TabH, 100, 112, 129, 130, 152. 
